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The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act
Abstract
In July, 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved Re-ULLCA - the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. The product of a three-year drafting process, heavily
influenced by 13 advisors appointed by the ABA, the new Act brings major innovations to the law of limited
liability companies. This article, written by the two co-reporters for the drafting committee: (i) explains why
the Conference decided to draft a new LLC statute, reviews the process through which the Conference
produced and approved the new Act, and describes the Act's basic architecture; (ii) highlights the Act's major
innovations; and (iii) provides a roadmap through the Act's intricate and all-important provisions concerning
the operating agreement.
The following specific topics are addressed: the operating agreement; the decision to deviate from RUPA and
un-cabin fiduciary duty; returning good faith and fair dealing to the concept's contract law moorings; the
question of an owner's legitimate self-interest; reformulating the duty of care; the question of the shelf LLC;
statutory apparent authority (de-codifying apparent authority by position); statements of authority by
position; templates for management structure; charging orders; a remedy for oppressive conduct; derivative
claims and special litigation committees; organic transactions - mergers, conversions, and domestications; the
decision to eschew the series LLC; and the lot of mere transferees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 13th, 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (“NCCUSL” or “the Conference”) “approved and recommended for 
enactment in all the States”1 the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(“Re-ULLCA”). This approval came ten years after the Conference approved the 
original Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“ULLCA”) and ended a drafting 
process that had itself spanned three years.2
The new Act brings major innovations to the law of limited liability companies, 
and NCCUSL has begun actively seeking enactments around the country. This 
article seeks to introduce the new Act to business lawyers across the country,3 by: 
(i) explaining why NCCUSL decided to draft a new LLC statute, reviewing the 
process through which the Conference produced and approved the new Act, and 
describing the Act’s basic architecture; (ii) highlighting the Act’s major innovations; 
and (iii) providing a roadmap through the Act’s intricate and all-important provi-
sions concerning the operating agreement.
II.  WHY A NEW LLC ACT NOW, BY WHOM AND HOW 
WAS THE NEW ACT DRAFTED, AND WHAT DOES 
THE NEW ACT LOOK LIKE?
A. WHY A NEW LLC ACT NOW?
The new Act’s Prefatory Note contains the most succinct explanation for “Why 
a new LLC Act Now?”
 1. Re-ULLCA, Cover. Re-ULLCA is available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006act_
fi nal.htm.
 2. Prefatory Note to Re-ULLCA. See also ULLCA drafting committee website, Welcome from the 
Chair, available at http://www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/DesktopDefault.aspx.
 3. As will be seen, the Act is already well known to leading practitioners and academics who 
have served as ABA Advisors to the Drafting Committee. See infra notes 5–12 and accompanying text 
(Part II-B).
07_Kleinberger.indd   516 5/27/2007   9:55:41 AM
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 517
Eighteen years have passed since the IRS issued its gate-opening Revenue Ruling 
88-76, declaring that a Wyoming LLC would be taxed as a partnership despite 
the entity’s corporate-like liability shield. More than eight years have passed since 
the IRS opened the gate still further with the “check the box” regulations. It is 
an opportune moment to identify the best elements of the myriad “fi rst genera-
tion” LLC statutes and to infuse those elements into a new, “second generation” 
uniform act.4
B. BY WHOM AND HOW WAS THE NEW ACT DRAFTED?
The Drafting Committee for Re-ULLCA was chaired by David Walker, Dean 
of the Drake Law School, included eight other commissioners, and benefi ted from 
the active participation of 13 advisors appointed by the ABA.5 In addition to the 
ABA Advisor,6 the Committee had eight advisors from the Business Law Section,7 
three from the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section,8 and one from the 
Section on Taxation.9 The current chair of the PUBO Committee was one of the 
Business Law Section’s Advisors,10 and the immediate past chair of that Commit-
tee was the ABA Advisor.11
As explained in March 2006 newsletter of the ABA Committee on Partnerships 
and Unincorporated Business Organizations:
ABA advisors actually outnumbered NCCUSL commissioners on the committee, 
and on most votes the committee’s chair counted commissioners and ABA advisors 
together as one group. On the rare occasions when the committee seemed signifi cantly 
divided, the chair took a formal vote of commissioners (as NCCUSL procedures 
require) but then also made note of a vote of the ABA advisors.12
The Drafting Committee also benefi ted from a scholarly perspective. As is 
usual, the co-reporters are law professors. In addition, the chair of the Committee 
 4. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006act_fi nal.
htm#_Toc147562675.
 5. The members of the drafting committee are listed at http://www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=49.
 6. Robert Keatinge.
 7. William J. Callison (from the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Orga-
nizations [“PUBO”]), William H. Clark, Jr. (from the Committee on Corporate Laws), Jon T. Hirschoff 
(from the Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions), Paul L. Lion, III (from PUBO; also representing the 
California State Bar), Scott E. Ludwig (from PUBO), Professor Elizabeth Stone Miller (from PUBO), 
Professor Sandra K. Miller (from PUBO), and Thomas E. Rutledge (from PUBO).
 8. Professor Thomas Earl Geu, Barry B. Nekritz and Robert Krapf.
 9. John R. Maxfi eld.
10. Professor Elizabeth Stone Miller.
11. Robert Keatinge.
12. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(“ULLCA”) and the Issue of “Corpufuscation,” Vol. XXII, no. 2, PUBOGRAM, at 7 (March 2006) [herein-
after “Progress Report”]. ABA infl uence was also strong among the commissioners. One was the original 
ABA Advisor to the Drafting Committee for RUPA and the fi rst recipient of the PUBO Committee’s 
Martin I. Lubaroff Award for contributions to law of unincorporated business organizations (Harry 
J. Haynsworth). Another had been the Tax Section’s Advisor to ULLCA and ULPA (2001) (Steven 
G. Frost). The ABA’s infl uence was felt most strongly on the question of “shelf LLCs.” See infra notes 
73–84 and accompanying text (Part III-F).
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is a law school dean,13 one of the members is a dean emeritus,14 and another is a 
law professor.15 One of the ABA advisors is a business school professor,16 and two 
others are law professors.17 Several of the ABA Advisors who are full-time practi-
tioners have also published several articles on LLC law.18 All and all, authors from 
the three leading LLC treatises were part of this working group.19
The drafting process spanned three years and included ten drafting commit-
tee meetings,20 six drafts,21 and consideration by the entire Conference at four 
consecutive annual meetings. Each committee meeting lasted two and a half days, 
and many key issues were debated, re-debated and re-debated.22 The Act was 
on the annual meeting agenda in 2003 (concept discussion, based on drafting 
committee’s briefi ng memo); 2004 (partial fi rst reading), 2005 (fi rst reading), and 
2006 (fi nal reading).23
13. David Walker is Dean of the Drake Law School.
14. Harry Haynsworth is Dean Emeritus of the William Mitchell College of Law.
15. Ann Anker is Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.
16. Sandra Miller is Professor of Accounting and Taxation at Widener University School of Business 
Administration.
17. Tom Geu is Professor of Law at University of South Dakota School of Law, and Elizabeth Miller 
is Professor of Law at Baylor Law School.
18. William J. Callison, “The Law Does Not Perfectly Comprehend. . . .”: The Inadequacy of the Gross 
Negligence Duty of Care Standard in Unincorporated Business Organizations, 94 KY. L.J. 451 (2005–06); 
William J. Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 109 
(1997); Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationship in Representing Limited Liability 
Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV 
389 (1995); Robert R. Keatinge, New Gang in Town Limited Liability Companies: An Introduction, 4 
BUS. L. TODAY 5 (1995); Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May 
Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 205 (2006); and Thomas E. 
Rutledge, The Lost Distinction Between Agency and Decisional Authority: Unfortunate Consequences of 
the Member-Managed Versus Manager-Managed Distinction in the Limited Liability Company, 93 KY. L.J. 
737 (2004–2005).
19. In alphabetical order by author: CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (1994 and Supp. 2006-2); [hereinafter “BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER”]; WIL-
LIAM J. CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND 
PRACTICE (2006); and LARRY A. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES (2d ed. 2003).
20. The drafting committee met during May 2003 in Atlanta, Georgia; June 2003 via telecon-
ference; November 2003 in Chicago, Illinois; April 2004 in Chicago, Illinois; June 2004 via tele-
conference; October 2004 in Chicago, Illinois; February 2005 at Phoenix, Arizona; May 2005 via 
teleconference; October 2005 via teleconference; and February 2006 via teleconference. See http://
www.llcproject.org/ULLCA/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=4&tabid=52.
21. http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee = 224.
22. See, e.g., Re-ULLCA, 2006 Annual Meeting Draft [hereinafter “2006 Annual Meeting Draft”], 
§ 409, cmt. (discussing the drafting committee’s many-splendored approaches to the duty of care is-
sue) and § 401, cmt. (discussing the committee’s internal debates over the “shelf LLC” issue), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006amdraft.htm.
23. It was highly unusual for the Conference to devote part of an annual meeting to a briefi ng 
memo. However, the chair of the Drafting Committee persuaded the Conference’s leadership that it 
was appropriate for the Conference to understand several fundamental conceptual innovations the 
Committee planned to make before the Committee (and its co-reporters) began the intensive labor of 
drafting statutory language.
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Article 1 contains general provisions, including defi nitions; sec-
tions on a limited liability company’s dura-
tion, purposes, powers, name, and agent for 
service of process; and three key provisions 
concerning the operating agreement
Article 2 provides for the formation of limited liability compa-
nies and for the public fi ling of records per-
taining to an LLC
Article 3 governs the relations of members and managers to 
third parties—i.e. with non-members deal-
ing with or affected by the limited liability 
company
Article 4 states the default rules for the members’ relation-
ship inter se and with the limited liability 
company and provides templates for mem-
ber-management and manager-management
Article 5 implements the “pick your partner” principle, which is at 
the core of the law of unincorporated busi-
ness organizations, and delimits the rights of 
transferees
Article 6 states the causes and consequences of a person’s 
dissociation as a member of a limited liability 
company
Article 7 delineates the causes and consequences of the dissolu-
tion of a limited liability company
Article 8 governs foreign limited liability companies
Article 9 provides for direct and derivative claims by members 
and for the establishment, conduct, and judi-
cial review of special litigation committees
Article 10 governs organic transactions—mergers, conversions, 
and domestications
Article 11 contains miscellaneous provisions, including a section 
providing transition rules for pre-existing 
limited liability companies
C. WHAT DOES THE NEW ACT LOOK LIKE?
Re-ULLCA’s architecture derives from and resembles that of RUPA, ULLCA, and 
ULPA (2001).
The only signifi cant nomenclature change from ULLCA is the use of “certifi -
cate of organization” rather than “articles of organization” to refer to the publicly 
fi led document used to create a limited liability company. The change is intended 
“to signal that: (i) the certifi cate merely refl ects the existence of an LLC (rather 
than being the locus for important governance rules); and (ii) this document is 
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signifi cantly different from articles of incorporation, which have a substantially 
greater power to affect inter se rules for the corporate entity and its owners.”24
III. MAJOR INNOVATIONS IN THE NEW ACT
The new Act’s major innovations concern:
a. the operating agreement;
b. the “un-cabining” of fi duciary duty;
c. the obligation of good faith and fair dealing;
d. an owner’s legitimate self-interest;
e. a reformulation of the duty of care;
f. the “shelf LLC” issue;
g. the question of “statutory apparent authority”;
h. statements of authority by position;
i. default rules on management structure;
j. charging orders;
k. a remedy for oppressive conduct;
l. derivative claims and special litigation committees; and
m. organic transactions—mergers, conversions, and domestications.
Also noteworthy are (i) the Act’s eschewal of the notion of a “series LLC,” and 
(ii) the situation faced under the Act by transferees.
A. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
The new Act defi nes the operating agreement very broadly: “ ‘Operating agree-
ment’ means the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agree-
ment and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all 
the members of a limited liability company, including a sole member, concern-
ing the matters described in Section 110(a).”25 Following the modern statutory 
trend26 (although not the axioms of contract law),27 this defi nition encompasses 
an “agreement” of the sole member of a single member LLC. Following partner-
ship law, the defi nition extends to the most informal of agreements.28
The operating agreement is an LLC’s foundational accord,29 even though forma-
tion of an LLC requires the fi ling of a document with a specifi ed public offi cial.30 
24. Re-ULLCA § 102(1) cmt. (emphasis in original). Most LLC statutes use the term “articles of 
organization.” See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.402 (West 
Supp. 2007); see generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, at ¶ 5.05. Delaware uses the term 
“certifi cate of formation.” DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2007).
25. Re-ULLCA § 102(13).
26. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 5.06 [3] [d].
27. As a matter of common law, a contract presupposes at least two parties. RICHARD A. LORD, 1 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2 (4th ed. 2006).
28. See RUPA § 101(7) (defi ning “partnership agreement”) and ULPA (2001) § 102 (13) (same). 
Compare Revised Model Business Corporations Act § 7.32(b)(1) (2005) (requiring shareholder agree-
ments to be in writing).
29. See the discussion infra at notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
30. Re-ULLCA § 201.
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31. According to Re-ULLCA § 110(a):
The operating agreement governs: (1) relations among the members as members and between the 
members and the limited liability company; (2) the rights and duties under this [act] of a person 
in the capacity of manager; (3) the activities of the company and the conduct of those activities; 
and (4) the means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.
32. “To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter described in subsection 
(a), this [act] governs the matter.” Re-ULLCA § 110(b) (emphasis added).
33. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050(a) (West 2006) which provides: “In order to form a limited 
liability company, one or more persons shall execute and fi le articles of organization with, and on a 
form prescribed by, the Secretary of State and, either before or after the fi ling of articles of organization, 
the members shall have entered into an operating agreement.” Id.
34. Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt.
35. Of course, under RUPA and ULPA (2001), the owners’ foundational document is called the part-
nership agreement rather than the operating agreement. See RUPA § 103(a); ULPA (2001) § 110(a).
36. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
37. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
The operating agreement’s domain is very broad,31 and the agreement is the fi rst 
place to look for the “deal” among the members.32
It is not required for an LLC to have an operating agreement,33 but it is inevi-
table:
[T]he Act’s very broad defi nition of “operating agreement” means that, as soon as 
a limited liability company has any members, the limited liability company has an 
operating agreement. For example, suppose: (i) two persons orally and informally 
agree to join their activities in some way through the mechanism of an LLC, (ii) they 
form the LLC or cause it to be formed, and (iii) without further ado or agreement, 
they become the LLC’s initial members. The LLC has an operating agreement; “all 
the members” have agreed on who the members are, and that agreement—no matter 
how informal or rudimentary—is an agreement “concerning the matters described in 
Section 110(a).”34
Continuing the tradition of RUPA, ULLCA, and ULPA (2001), the new Act 
centralizes all provisions dealing with the power and effect of the operating agree-
ment.35 “However, because an operating agreement raises issues too numerous 
and complex to include easily in a single section, the new Act uses three related 
sections to address the operating agreement.”36 Section 110 delineates the scope 
and general power of operating agreement and states an important and specifi c 
set of limitations on that power. Sections 111 and 112 deal with operating agree-
ment mechanics and with the effect of the operating agreement on specifi ed third 
persons and on the LLC itself.
Recognizing that “[o]ne of the most complex questions in the law of unincor-
porated business organizations is the extent to which an agreement among the 
organization’s owners can affect the law of fi duciary duty,”37 Section 110 considers 
in detail the extent to which the operating agreement can defi ne, alter, or elimi-
nate aspects of fi duciary duty; expressly authorizes the operating agreement to 
relieve members and managers from liability for money damages arising from 
breach of duty (subject to specifi ed limitations), and provides specifi c guidance 
for courts asked to invalidate an operating agreement provision on the grounds 
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that the provision is “manifestly unreasonable.”38 These provisions are especially 
important, given the Drafting Committee’s decision to “un-cabin” fi duciary duty.
B. “UN-CABINING” FIDUCIARY DUTY
For almost a century, Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon has been 
the touchstone of the law of fi duciary duty among “[j]oint adventurers [and] co-
partners,”39 and before RUPA, fi duciary duty in unincorporated business organi-
zations was mostly a matter of case law.40 According to the Comments to RUPA, 
“the UPA . . . touches only sparingly on a partner’s duty of loyalty and leaves any 
further development of the fi duciary duties of partners to the common law of 
agency.”41
RUPA took a radically different approach and sought to codify exhaustively all 
fi duciary duties relevant to a RUPA partnership and its partners.42 The underlying 
idea was to “cabin in” fi duciary duty so as to protect partnership agreements from 
judicial second-guessing.43
38. See the discussion infra at notes 39–52 and accompanying text (Section IV- B).
39. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
40. Re-ULLCA § 409(a) and (b) cmt. (stating that “[u]ntil the promulgation of RUPA, it was almost 
axiomatic that . . . fi duciary duties refl ect judge-made law”).
41. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1. The reference to the common law of agency was perhaps too narrow. 
Partnership law had (and has) its own case law of fi duciary duty. E.g., Peskin v. Deutsch, 479 N.E.2d 
1034, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“the fi duciary duty owed by one partner to another includes a duty 
to make full and fair disclosure”); Klotz v. Klotz, 117 S.E.2d 650, 656 (Va. 1961) (“[t]he relationship 
of partners is of a fi duciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and 
integrity in their dealings with one another in the partnership affairs”). Cases discussing the duty of 
loyalty often sound in equity. E.g., Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. 817 A.2d 
160, 175 (Del. 2002) (stating, “breach of the duty of loyalty . . . permits broad, discretionary, and equi-
table remedies”); Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Cantor, No 16297, 2000 WL 307370, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
13, 2000) (holding breach of duty of loyalty did not permit an injunction in this case but did result 
in “other equitable relief”).
42. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1 (“Section 404 is both comprehensive and exclusive.”). RUPA § 404(a) 
provides that “The only fi duciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are 
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).” (emphasis added). Those 
subsections characterize a partner’s duty of loyalty (subsection (b)) and care (subsection (c)) as “limited 
to” the obligations stated therein. (emphasis added).
43. See William J. Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 109, 115 
(1997) (“RUPA attempts to displace common law rules that coexisted with the UPA, including com-
mon law fi duciary duty rules.”); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partner-
ships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 451 (1997) (“In [Section 
404] [RUPA] constricts the ability of courts to expand the concept of fi duciary duties. [T]he evident 
purpose of this constriction is to increase the certainty and reliability of partnership agreements. . . .”). 
See also Transcript of 2006 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, Saturday Morning Session, July 8, 2006, at 44 
(on fi le with The Business Lawyer) (remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “Just for those people who 
may not be in touch with the lingo, when we are talking about cabining in, that was RUPA’s contribu-
tion to say it was going to codify all those fi duciary duties, and that is what we have undone here.”); 
Re-ULLCA § 409(a) and (b), cmt. (“In an effort to respect freedom of contract, bolster predictability, 
and protect partnership agreements from second-guessing, the Conference decided that RUPA should 
fence or “cabin in” all fi duciary duties within a statutory formulation.”).
07_Kleinberger.indd   522 5/27/2007   9:55:41 AM
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 523
Both ULLCA and ULPA (2001) followed RUPA,44 but from the outset Re-
ULLCA’s Drafting Committee was skeptical of this “cabin in” approach.45 
Eventually, the Committee and the Conference decided that, at least in the 
realm of limited liability companies, progress may be retrograde and “the 
‘cabin in’ approach creates more problems than it solves.”46 The “cabin in” 
approach ignores the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of members to 
avoid oppressing fellow members,47 produces great difficulty in dealing with 
member-to-member disclosure obligations in member-to-member buy-sell 
transactions,48 and puts inordinate pressure on the concept of “good faith and 
fair dealing.”49
As explained in the new Act’s Prefatory Note:
the better way to protect the operating agreement from judicial second-guessing 
is to:
* increase and clarify the power of the operating agreement to defi ne or re-shape 
fi duciary duties (including the power to eliminate aspects of fi duciary duties); and
* provide some guidance to courts when a person seeks to escape an agreement 
by claiming its provisions are “manifestly unreasonable.”50
44. ULPA (2001), § 408 (“[t]he only fi duciary duties that a general partner has to the limited part-
nership and the other partners are the duties of loyalty and care . . . . A general partner’s duty of loyalty 
to the limited partnership and the other partners is limited to. . . . A general partner’s duty of care to 
the limited partnership and the other partners . . . is limited to. . . .”) and ULLCA § 409 (“[t]he only 
fi duciary duties a member owes . . . are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . . A member’s duty of 
loyalty . . . is limited to. . . . A member’s duty of care . . . is limited to. . . .”).
45. Revision of Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Preliminary Report, 2003 NCCUSL 
Annual Meeting, August, 2003, at 9, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/ann-meet-
draft03.pdf.
46. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act. See also Transcript of the 
2006 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 5 (remarks of Chairman David Walker “We have, 
we say, ‘uncabined’ fi duciary duty.”).
47. See infra notes 111–32 and accompanying text (Part III-K).
48. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 583, 636–39 (2004) [hereinafter “User’s Guide”] (explaining the diffi culty of relying 
on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, because that obligation must be tied to some duty or 
right under the statute or the partnership agreement). See also Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, 
supra note 43, at 44 (Remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “Tremendous diffi culty [exists if we try] 
to deal with disclosure duties inter se members by statute. We tried it several times, Carter [Bishop, 
co-reporter] and I. Every time we wrote something, the committee looked at it and said, you’re writing 
a miniature securities act here. We don’t want it. So, the fi duciary duty of disclosure is an important 
aspect of this.”).
49. User’s Guide, supra note 48. See also Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 
44 (Remarks of Co-Reporter Kleinberger: “[W]e are already seeing pressure in the courts on the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. When you say there are no other fi duciary duties and courts for 
hundreds of years have looked to fi duciary duties as a policing mechanism that they can develop, if 
you say you can’t have fi duciary duties, they will go to good faith. And, in fact, I had a conversation 
with . . . [t]he judge of North Carolina’s business court [who] said, if you stop us on fi duciary duty, 
we will just go to good faith.”). For further discussion of pressure on the duty of good faith, in an 
analogous context, see Carter G. Bishop, A Good Faith Revival of Duty of Care Liability In Business 
Organization Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2006).
50. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
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As further explained by the chair of the Drafting Committee:
T]he efforts of the [drafting] committee [to uncabin fi duciary duty] resulted in further 
articulation, clarifi cation, elaboration, expansion of the freedom under Section 110 
[powers of the operating agreement] to defi ne the standards by which performance 
was to be measured. Particularly, [ABA] advisors . . . were concerned that the oper-
ating agreement be permitted to defi ne the standards of performance. So the net 
effect . . . is to give further impetus to the members to defi ne their obligations through 
the contract.51
Accordingly, Section 409 of the new Act partially codifi es the duties of loyalty 
and care:
(a) A member of a member-managed limited liability company owes to the com-
pany and, subject to Section 901(b), the other members the fi duciary duties of loyalty 
and care stated in subsections (b) and (c).
(b) The duty of loyalty of a member in a member-managed limited liability com-
pany includes the duties:
(1) to account to the company and to hold as trustee for it any property, profi t, or 
benefi t derived by the member:
(A) in the conduct or winding up of the company’s activities;
(B) from a use by the member of the company’s property; or
(C) from the appropriation of a limited liability company opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of 
the company’s activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the 
company; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of the company’s 
activities before the dissolution of the company.
(c) Subject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member of 
a member-managed limited liability company in the conduct and winding up of 
the company’s activities is to act with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the member rea-
sonably believes to be in the best interests of the company. In discharging this duty, 
a member may rely in good faith upon opinions, reports, statements, or other in-
formation provided by another person that the member reasonably believes is a 
competent and reliable source for the information.
. . . .
(g) In a manager-managed limited liability company, the following rules apply:
(1) Subsections (a), (b), [and] (c), . . . apply to the manager or managers and not 
the members.52
C.  RETURNING GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING TO THE CONCEPT’S 
CONTRACT LAW MOORINGS
Consistent with the new Act’s focus on the operating agreement, Section 409 
returns the “the obligation of good faith and fair dealing” to that concept’s contract 
law moorings.
51. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 44 (Remarks of Chairman Walker).
52. Re-ULLCA § 409(a), (b), (c), and (g) (emphasis added). Note the absence of “only” and 
“limited to.”
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It was RUPA that fi rst codifi ed the obligation as part of a business entity 
statute,53 but that codifi cation did not mention the obligation’s contract law na-
ture. RUPA § 404(d) states simply: “A partner shall discharge the duties to the 
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership 
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing.” RUPA’s Comments, while recognizing the concept’s contract 
law origin,54 took a very broad, open-ended view of the obligation:
The meaning of “good faith and fair dealing” is not fi rmly fi xed under present law. 
“Good faith” clearly suggests a subjective element, while “fair dealing” implies an ob-
jective component. It was decided to leave the terms undefi ned in the Act and allow 
the courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases.55
ULLCA and ULPA (2001) each adopted the RUPA formulation essentially ver-
batim,56 but the new Act does not. Instead, Section 409(d) includes the word 
“contractual” to modify the “obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”57
The difference is intended to signal a more conservative view of the obligation—
i.e., “to emphasize that the obligation is not an invitation to re-write agreements 
among the members.”58 As the Comment to Section 409(d) explains:
[T]he obligation should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from con-
duct that is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated 
when the arrangements were made . . . . In sum, the purpose of the obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing is to protect the arrangement the partners have chosen for them-
selves, not to restructure that arrangement under the guise of safeguarding it.59
D. THE QUESTION OF AN OWNER’S LEGITIMATE SELF-INTEREST
The new Act also differs from RUPA on how to approach the “schizoid” nature 
of owner-to-owner relations in a closely held business.60 Despite Cardozo’s admo-
nition in Meinhard that “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of 
53. The obligation is implied by the common law (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(1981)) and had been previously codifi ed in, inter alia, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. 
§§ 1-304 (2001), 2-103(j) (2003)).
54. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4 notes: “The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a contract concept, 
imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership.”
55. RUPA § 404 cmt. 4.
56. ULLCA § 409(d) and ULPA (2001) § 408(d). However, ULPA’ s Comments took a decidedly 
narrower view of the obligation, stating: “Courts should not use the obligation to change ex post facto 
the parties’ or this Act’s allocation of risk and power. To the contrary, in light of the nature of a limited 
partnership, the obligation should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct 
that is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated when the arrangements 
were made.” ULPA (2001) § 305(b) cmt.
57. Re-ULLCA § 409(d) states: “A member in a member-managed limited liability company or a 
manager-managed limited liability company shall discharge the duties under this [act] or under the 
operating agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing.” (Emphasis added).
58. Id. § 409(d) cmt.
59. Id. (quoting ULPA (2001), § 305(b) cmt.).
60. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 199 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2002) 
(“UPA’s schizoid approach”).
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the market place,”61 owners of a closely held business have “certain rights to what 
has been termed ‘selfi sh ownership. . . .’ ”62
RUPA tried to express this concept by stating: “[a] partner does not violate a 
duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely 
because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.”63 ULLCA and 
ULPA (2001) each incorporate this language,64 but the new Act does not. As ex-
plained in the Comments to Re-ULLCA, Section 409: “This language is inappro-
priate in the complex and variegated world of LLCs. As a proposition of contract 
law, the language is axiomatic and therefore unnecessary. In the context of fi du-
ciary duty, the language is at best incomplete, at worst wrong, and in any event 
confusing.”65
There is no simple, concise way to explicate the “schizoid” fi duciary duty of an 
LLC member. Part III-K of this Article does, however, explain how this Act ap-
proaches member-to-member fi duciary duty.66
E. REFORMULATING THE DUTY OF CARE
The UPA states no standard of care, and RUPA sets a low standard: “[a] partner’s 
duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding 
up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly 
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of 
law.”67 ULLCA and ULPA (2001) both copy RUPA.68
After much debate, the Drafting Committee and the Conference decided that, 
in a post-Enron era, gross negligence sets the bar too low.69 The Committee and 
61. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
62. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
63. RUPA § 404(e).
64. ULPA (2001) § 408(e) and ULLCA § 409(e).
65. Re-ULLCA § 409(e), cmt. In place of the omitted language, subsection 409(e) makes an im-
portant point about the duty of loyalty: “It is a defense to a claim under subsection (b)(2) [confl ict 
of interest; adverse dealings] and any comparable claim in equity or at common law that the transac-
tion was fair to the limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 409(e). Although the subsection states “a 
well-established principle of judge-made law,” the statement is useful: “Given this Act’s very detailed 
treatment of fi duciary duties and especially the Act’s very detailed treatment of the power of the oper-
ating agreement to modify fi duciary duties, the statement is important because its absence might be 
confusing.” Re-ULLCA § 409(e) cmt.
66. See infra at notes 111–32 and accompanying text.
67. RUPA § 404(c).
68. ULPA (2001) § 408(c) and ULLCA § 409(c).
69. The 2006 Annual Meeting Draft contains the following history of the Drafting Committee’s 
discussions of this issue:
This section’s history was conceptually tumultuous. For some time, the uncertainty pertained 
to the appropriate standard for the duty of care. At its November, 2003 meeting, at the urging 
of Commissioner Blackburn, the Drafting Committee decided to try to (i) eschew the “gross 
negligence” standard of care fi rst promulgated in RUPA and afterwards followed in ULLCA 
and ULPA (2001); and (ii) incorporate something like the standard of care/standard of liability 
dichotomy recently adopted in MBCA §§ 8.30 and 8.31. Under the MBCA, that dichotomy exists 
principally for directors and not for offi cers, cf. MBCA 8.42(c) (stating that director standard of 
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Conference were also infl uenced by the fact that many LLC statutes state an ordi-
nary care standard.70
The new Act’s standard is a hybrid—ordinary care expressly subject to the busi-
ness judgment rule:
(c) Subject to the business judgment rule, the duty of care of a member of a member-
managed limited liability company in the conduct and winding up of the company’s 
activities is to act with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably ex-
ercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the member reasonably believes 
to be in the best interests of the company.
. . . .
(g) In a manager-managed limited liability company, . . . [subsection] (c). . .appl[ies] 
to the manager or managers and not the members.71
A detailed Comment explains the rationale:
In some circumstances, an unadorned standard of ordinary care is appropriate for 
those in charge of a business organization or similar, non-business enterprise. In 
liability principles apply to offi cers if they “have relevance), and those positions refl ect categori-
cally different kinds of responsibilities.
 In response, the co-reporters drafted and the Committee considered a version of this sec-
tion and a companion section, Section 410, that together attempted to parallel functionally the 
MBCA’s positional distinction by using the defi ned terms “governance responsibility” and “opera-
tional responsibilities.” (The draft also differed from the MBCA approach by leaving unaffected 
the traditional rules for duty of loyalty violations.)
 At its April 2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee discussed the proposal at length and with 
good-natured intensity. When the dust cleared, no one had moved to change any language. How-
ever, there was considerable sentiment expressed in favor of collapsing the two sections into one 
provision and somehow reinstating the gross negligence standard in combination with a business 
judgment rule formulation.
 The chair of the Committee then directed the co-reporters to draft a single section, which 
was presented to and adopted by the Committee during a teleconference. That single section 
was distributed to the 2004 Annual Meeting as a supplement to the Act and was read in place of 
the Sections 409 and 410 included in the Annual Meeting draft. At its October, 2004 meeting, 
the Drafting Committee again vigorously debated the topic of fi duciary duty, but no changes 
were moved.
 . . . .
 At its February, 2006 meeting, the Committee returned again to the vexing question of the 
appropriate standard of care and reached a compromise—maintaining an ordinary negligence 
standard but expressly superimposing the business judgment rule.
2006 Annual Meeting Draft § 409 cmt. At the 2006 Annual Meeting, the Conference considered and 
defeated a motion from the fl oor to return to the gross negligence standard. Transcript of 2006 Annual 
Meeting, supra note 43, at 47–51.
70. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom With the Need For Manda-
tory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV 1609, 1658 (2004) 
(article has two tables in the appendix summarizing state LLC statutes standard of care: 21 states with 
“good faith prudent person” language and 19 states using “gross negligence or willful misconduct” lan-
guage); Elizabeth S. Miller and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: 
The Business Judgment Rule in Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 366–68 
(2005) (“Approximately eighteen state LLC statutes parallel language formerly used in the MBCA and 
require managers and managing members to act in good faith and exercise the care of an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances.”).
71. Re-ULLCA § 409(c) and (g)(1).
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others, the proper application of the duty of care must take into account the diffi cul-
ties inherent in establishing an enterprise’s most fundamental policies, supervising 
the enterprise’s overall activities, or making complex business judgments. Corporate 
law subdivides circumstances somewhat according to the formal role exercised by the 
person whose conduct is later challenged (e.g., distinguishing the duties of directors 
from the duties of offi cers). LLC law cannot follow that approach, because a hallmark 
of the LLC entity is its structural fl exibility.
This subsection, therefore, seeks “the best of both worlds”—stating a standard 
of ordinary care but subjecting that standard to the business judgment rule to the 
extent circumstances warrant. The content and force of the business judgment rule 
vary across jurisdictions, and therefore the meaning of this subsection may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
That result is intended. In any jurisdiction, the business judgment rule’s applica-
tion will vary depending on the nature of the challenged conduct. There is, for ex-
ample, very little (if any) judgment involved when a person with managerial power 
acts (or fails to act) on an essentially ministerial matter. Moreover, under the law of 
many jurisdictions, the business judgment rule applies similarly across the range of 
business organizations. That is, the doctrine is suffi ciently broad and conceptual so 
that the formality of organizational choice is less important in shaping the application 
of the rule than are the nature of the challenged conduct and the responsibilities and 
authority of the person whose conduct is being challenged.
This Act seeks therefore to invoke rather than unsettle whatever may be each juris-
diction’s approach to the business judgment rule.72
F. THE QUESTION OF THE “SHELF LLC”
In practice, many attorneys (and their clients) wish to have a limited liability 
company formed and on the public record while the relevant deal coalesces—
i.e., before the precise identity and relationship of the members has been fi nally 
determined. In theory, according to some advisors to the Drafting Committee, a 
member-less LLC is an oxymoron and having an LLC waiting “on the shelf” for 
the members to be identifi ed is an example of the “corpufuscation” of partner-
ship law.73
“No issue roiled the drafting process to this Act more than the question of ‘shelf 
LLCs,’ ”74 and a compromise was reached at the Drafting Committee’s fi nal meeting 
72. Re-ULLCA § 409(c) cmt. The new Act also approaches this subject from the other direction—
i.e., by expressly authorizing the operating agreement to exculpate a member or manager from liability 
for breach of the duty of care. Re-ULLCA § 110(g). See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
73. Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 827, 872–73 (2005) [hereinafter “Prism”] and Progress Report, supra note 12, at 11 
(2006). Other “theorists” point out that the LLC departed from its partnership moorings when LLC 
statutes recognized the single member LLC. Id.
74. Re-ULLCA, 2006 Annual Meeting Draft, § 401 cmt. The Comment to the fi nal statutory text 
has a less dramatic tone: “No topic received more attention or generated more debate in the drafting 
process for this Act than the question of the ‘shelf LLC’—i.e., an LLC formed without having at least one 
member upon formation. Reasonable minds differed (occasionally intensely) as to whether the ‘shelf’ 
approach (i) is necessary to accommodate current business practices; and (ii) somehow does conceptual 
violence to the partnership antecedents of the limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 201 cmt.
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(during the 2006 annual meeting).75 Most LLCs will be formed with at least one 
person becoming a member upon formation,76 but the new Act “permits an orga-
nizer to fi le a certifi cate of organization without a person ‘waiting in the wings.’ ”77
For the latter situation, the Act requires two fi lings to form the LLC. The or-
ganizer must fi rst deliver the certifi cate of organization for fi ling,78 and, “if the 
company will have no members when the [Secretary of State] fi les the certifi cate, 
[the certifi cate must contain] a statement to that effect.”79
The fi rst fi ling is a just a precursor. Section 201 “provides that the LLC is not 
formed until and unless at least one person becomes a member and the organizer 
makes a second fi ling stating that the LLC has at least one member.”80 The second 
fi ling must state “the date on which a person or persons became the company’s 
initial member or members.”81
The Act suggests a deadline of 90 days for the second fi ling.82 If the deadline is 
not met, the original fi ling “lapses and is void.”83 If the deadline is met, the limited 
liability company is “deemed formed as of the date of initial membership stated” 
in the required second fi ling.84
75. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 23 (Remarks of Chairman Walker stating 
that the committee’s amendment to the annual meeting draft “does reveal a compromise”).
76. Re-ULLCA § 201(b)(3) and (d)(1) (providing that, unless the certifi cate of organization states 
that “the company will have no members when the [Secretary of State] fi les the certifi cate,” a “limited 
liability company is formed when the [Secretary of State] has fi led the certifi cate of organization and 
the company has at least one member, unless the certifi cate states a delayed effective date”).
77. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act. Re-ULLCA § 201(b)(3).
78. Re-ULLCA § 201(a).
79. Id. § 201(b)(3).
80. Id. Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
81. Id. § 201(e)(1)(B).
82. Id. § 201(e)(1) (placing the number 90 within brackets). See NCCUSL Drafting Rule 406, cmt. 
(characterizing bracketed material as suggested).
83. Re-ULLCA § 201(e)(1).
84. Re-ULLCA § 201(e)(2). As a practical matter, the complexity inherent in the Act’s compromise 
will be of greatest interest to lawyers asked to provide third party opinion letters. A detailed treatment 
of that subject is beyond the scope of this article, but the following summary may be helpful.
(1) The principal purpose of a third party opinion letter is to indicate that a business organization 
has the legal capacity to bind itself to a particular, signifi cant transaction.
(2) To have that capacity, the organization must, of course, exist as a legal entity. In this connec-
tion, third party opinion letters traditionally consider both whether a business organization was “duly 
formed” and is “validly existing.”
(3) Under Re-ULLCA, due formation involves the limited liability company having at least one 
member upon formation—either: (i) when the fi ling offi cer fi les the certifi cate of organization, Re-
ULLCA § 201(d)(1), or (ii) when, subsequent to that fi ling, the organizer admits a person as an initial 
member, delivers to the fi ling offi cer a statement so indicating, and the fi ling offi cer fi les the statement. 
Re-ULLCA §§ 201(e)(2) and 401(c).
(4) The fi ling offi cer’s act of fi ling the certifi cate under § 201(d)(1) or the statement under 
§ 201(e)(2) is, as a statutory matter, “conclusive proof that the organizer satisfi ed all conditions to the 
formation of a limited liability company.” Re-ULLCA § 201(d)(3) and (e)(3).
(5) As for the opinion letter concept of “validly existing,” it may be appropriate to ascertain that at 
the moment of formation the limited liability company did indeed have at least one member.
For a more detailed discussion of opinion issues concerning limited liability companies, see Rob-
ert R. Keatinge, Shelf LLCs and Opinion Letter Issues: Exegesis and Eisegesis of LLC Statutes, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 2, PUBOGRAM 15 (March 2006). See also TriBar Opinion Committee, Third-Party Closing Opin-
ions: Limited Liability Companies, 61 BUS. LAW. 679 (2006).
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G. STATUTORY APPARENT AUTHORITY
The power of a member or manager of a business organization to bind the orga-
nization to third parties is in essence a question of agency law, and in this context 
one of the most important rules of agency law is apparent authority by position.85 
Most LLC statutes codify this concept, providing “what might be termed ‘statutory 
apparent authority’ for members in a member-managed limited liability company 
and managers in a manager-managed limited liability company.”86
This approach traces back to the original Uniform Partnership Act87 and has 
been copied by RUPA, ULLCA, ULPA (2001)88 and myriad state LLC statutes.89 
Nevertheless, the Drafting Committee determined that statutory apparent author-
ity is inappropriate for limited liability companies, because:
• codifying power to bind according to position makes sense only for orga-
nizations that have well-defi ned, well-known, and almost paradigmatic 
management structures; and
• limited liability companies feature almost infi nite fl exibility of manage-
ment structure and an LLC’s name provides no clue as to the LLC’s man-
agement structure.
As explained in a March 2006 “Progress Report on the Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act”:
The concept [of statutory apparent authority] still makes sense both for general and 
limited partnerships. A third party dealing with either type of partnership can know 
by the formal name of the entity and by a person’s status as general or limited partner 
whether the person has the power to bind the entity.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, Introduction (2006) [hereinafter “R.3d Agency”] (“This Restate-
ment . . . discusses at length the application of agency doctrine to organizations. Many agents hold posi-
tions in organizations. This Restatement thus covers applications of agency doctrine to persons who act 
as representatives of corporations, partnerships, other business organizations, and private not-for-profi t 
entities. In that context, the focal point for the application of agency doctrine is determining either the 
duties owed the organization by those holding positions within it or the consequences of interactions 
between actors in positions defi ned by one organization with individuals external to the organization 
or with actors who hold positions in another organization.”); id. § 1.03 cmt. b (“If the principal places 
a person in a position or offi ce with specifi c functions or responsibilities, from which third parties will 
infer that the principal assents to acts by the person requisite to fulfi lling the specifi c functions or re-
sponsibilities, the principal has manifested such assent to third parties.”); id. § 3.03 cmt. b (“A principal 
may also make a manifestation by placing an agent in a defi ned position in an organization . . . . Third 
parties who interact with the principal through the agent will naturally and reasonably assume that the 
agent has authority to do acts consistent with the agent’s position . . . unless they have notice of facts 
suggesting that this may not be so.”); id. § 3.03 cmt. c (“Apparent authority in an organizational setting 
may also arise from the fact that a person occupies a type of position that customarily carries specifi c 
authority although the organization has withheld such authority from that agent.”).
86. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) cmt.
87. Uniform Partnership Act § 9(1) (1914) [hereinafter “UPA”] (providing) that “the act of every 
partner . . . for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership . . . binds the 
partnership”).
88. RUPA § 301; ULLCA § 301; ULPA (2001) § 402.
89. For a discussion of this approach in LLC statutes, see BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, 
¶ 7.05 [3].
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Most LLC statues have attempted to use the same approach but with a fundamen-
tally important (and problematic) distinction. An LLC’s status as member-managed 
or manager-managed determines whether members or managers have the statutory 
power to bind. But an LLC’s status as member- or manager-managed is not apparent 
from the LLC’s name. A third party must check the public record, which may reveal 
that the LLC is manager-managed, which in turn means a member as member has no 
power to bind the LLC. As a result, a provision that originated in 1914 as a protec-
tion for third parties can, in the LLC context, easily function as a trap for the unwary. 
The problem is exacerbated by the almost infi nite variety of management structures 
permissible in and used by LLCs.90
Thus, “it makes no sense to require each LLC to publicly select between two 
statutorily preordained structures (i.e., manager-managed/member-managed) 
and . . . link a ‘statutory power to bind’ to each of those two structures.”91 Ac-
cordingly, Section 301 of the new Act states simply that: “A member is not 
an agent of a limited liability company solely by reason of being a member. A 
person’s status as a member does not prevent or restrict law other than this [act] 
from imposing liability on a limited liability company because of the person’s 
conduct.”92
Under the new Act, the question of a member or manager’s power to bind 
becomes a matter of agency law:
[Section 301] expressly preserves the power of other law to hold an LLC directly or 
vicariously liable on account of conduct by a person who happens to be a member. 
For example, given the proper set of circumstances: (i) a member might have actual 
or apparent authority to bind an LLC to a contract; (ii) the doctrine of respondeat 
superior might make an LLC liable for the tortuous conduct of a member (i.e., in 
some circumstances a member acts as a “servant” of the LLC); and (iii) an LLC might 
be liable for negligently supervising a member who is acting on behalf of the LLC. A 
person’s status as a member does not weigh against any of these or any other relevant 
theories of law.
Moreover, subsection (a) does not prevent member status from being relevant to 
one or more elements of an “other law” theory. The most categorical example con-
cerns the authority of a non-manager member of a manager-managed LLC.
EXAMPLE: A vendor knows that an LLC is manager-managed but chooses to 
accept the signature of a person whom the vendor knows is merely a member of the 
LLC. Assuring the vendor that the LLC will stand by the member’s commitment, the 
member states, “It’s such a simple matter; no one will mind.” The member genuinely 
believes the statement, and the vendor accepts the assurance.
90. Progress Report, supra note 12, at 10 (emphasis in original).
91. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) cmt. See also R.3d Agency, supra note 85, §3.03 cmt. c (“Moreover, the 
fact that any given organization has a particular legal form does not mean that its actual operational 
practices conform perfectly to legal form. Organizations vary widely in the degree to which they 
operate informally or formally in making decisions and in interacting with third parties external to 
the organization. Organizations also vary in the degree to which authority is associated solely with 
a position within an organizational hierarchy or is personalized to a particular individual regardless 
of the organization’s formal association of authority with defi ned positions.”).
92. Re-ULLCA § 301(a) and (b).
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The person’s status as a mere member will undermine a claim of apparent authority. 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03, cmt. d (2006) (explaining the “reasonable belief” 
element of a claim of apparent authority, and role played by context, custom, and the 
supposed agent’s position in an organization). Likewise, the member will have no ac-
tual authority. Absent additional facts, section 407(c)(1) (vesting all management au-
thority in the managers) renders the member’s belief unreasonable. Restatement (Third) 
of Agency § 2.01, cmt. c (2006) (explaining the “reasonable belief” element of a claim 
of actual authority).93
Although “under section 301(a), . . . the mere fact that a person is a member of 
a member-managed limited liability company cannot by itself establish apparent 
authority by position. . . . [a] course of dealing . . . may easily change the analysis.”94 
Another example from the Comments illustrates this point:
EXAMPLE: David is a one of two members of DS, LLC, a member-managed LLC. 
David orders paper clips on behalf of the LLC, signing the purchase agreement, 
“David, as a member of DS, LLC.” The vendor accepts the order, sends an invoice 
to the LLC’s address, and in due course receives a check drawn on the LLC’s bank 
account. When David next places an order with the vendor, the LLC’s payment of the 
fi rst order is a manifestation that the vendor may use in establishing David’s apparent 
authority to place the second order.95
The Comments to Sections 301 and 407 analyze in detail how agency law will 
function in the absence of statutory apparent authority. The results will be accept-
able even for pre-existing LLCs, formed under a statute that provided for statutory 
apparent authority, because “the notion of ‘lingering apparent authority’ will pro-
tect any third party that has previously relied on the statutory apparent authority 
of a member of a particular member-managed LLC or a manager of a particular 
manager-managed LLC.”96
H. STATEMENTS OF AUTHORITY BY POSITION
Eliminating statutory apparent authority eliminates the need to have an LLC’s 
certifi cate of organization indicate the LLC’s management structure. However, the 
members of an LLC might want to make public their management structure in 
order to facilitate transactions and to avoid “having to disclose to third parties the 
entirety of the operating agreement.”97
The new Act addresses this issue by authorizing a statement of authority 
pertaining to a position. RUPA pioneered the notion of a publicly-fi led statement 
93. Re-ULLCA § 301(b) cmt.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Re-ULLCA § 1104 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.11 cmt. c (2006)) (Application to 
Existing Relationships), Legislative Note (stating that “[s]ection 301 (de-codifying statutory apparent 
authority) does not require any special transition provisions”).
97. Re-ULLCA § 302(a)(2) cmt.
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of authority pertaining to particular partners,98 and Re-ULLCA takes that concept 
a step further. Under Re-ULLCA, § 302(a)(2), a statement of authority:
with respect to any position that exists in or with respect to the company, may state 
the authority, or limitations on the authority, of all persons holding the position to:
(A) execute an instrument transferring real property held in the name of the com-
pany; or
(B) enter into other transactions on behalf of, or otherwise act for or bind, the 
company . . . .99
As with RUPA, statements of authority concerning real property can give con-
structive notice if properly fi led in the real estate records, while other statements 
of authority affect only third parties with knowledge. As explained by the Com-
ment to Re-ULLCA Section 302:
This section is derived from and builds on RUPA, § 303, and, like that provision 
is conceptually divided into two realms: statements pertaining to the power to 
transfer interests in the LLC’s real property and statements pertaining to other mat-
ters. In the latter realm, statements are fi led only in the records of the [Secretary of 
State], operate only to the extent the statements are actually known. Section 302(d) 
and (e).
As to interests in real property, in contrast, this section: (i) requires double-fi ling—
with the [Secretary of State] and in the appropriate land records; and (ii) provides 
for constructive knowledge of statements limiting authority. Thus, a properly fi led 
and recorded statement can protect the limited liability company, Section 302(g), 
and, in order for a statement pertaining to real property to be a sword in the hands 
of a third party, the statement must have been both fi led and properly recorded. 
Section 302(f ).100
I. TEMPLATES FOR MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Most LLC statutes provide for default rules for two types of management 
structure—member-management and manager-management.101 The new Act con-
tinues these templates but innovates in two signifi cant ways.
First, the Act permits the operating agreement rather than the certifi cate of or-
ganization to establish an LLC’s management structure.102 This approach is made 
possible by the Act’s eschewal of statutory apparent authority.
98. RUPA § 303.
99. Re-ULLCA § 302(a)(2). The section also permits statements of authority as to “a specifi c 
person.” Id. § 302(a)(3).
100. Id. § 302 cmt.
101. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 7.02 [2] and [3].
102. Re-ULLCA § 407(a). If the operating agreement does not specify manager-management, 
for purposes of the Act’s operative provision the LLC will be member-managed. That is, “member-
managed” is the default setting. Id. § 102(10) ( “ ‘Manager-managed limited liability company’ means 
a limited liability company that qualifi es under Section 407(a).”); id. §102(12) (“ ‘Member-managed 
limited liability company’ means a limited liability company that is not a manager-managed limited 
liability company.”).
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Second, the Act recognizes that the statutory templates are just that. Some 
LLCs use neither of the templates for management structure, and many LLCs start 
with one of the templates but (via the operating agreement) alter signifi cantly the 
allocation of power among the members or between members and managers. Ac-
cordingly, the Act carefully contemplates how managerial duties might shift to cor-
respond with the particular management relationships chosen by the members.103
J. CHARGING ORDERS
The charging order is a venerable part of the law of unincorporated business 
organizations104 and is an essential buttress to the “pick your partner” principle 
that is central to the law of limited liability companies.105 The new Act reinforces 
the principle by modernizing the statutory language on charging orders. The goal 
is “that the language (and its protections against outside interference in an LLC’s 
activities) can be readily understood.”106
The charging order is a lien in favor of the judgment creditor of a member or 
transferee which applies against the transferable interest of the judgment debtor. 
Once in effect and duly served on the limited liability company, a charging order 
“requires the limited liability company to pay over to the person to which the 
charging order was issued any distribution that would otherwise be paid to the 
judgment debtor.”107
The order functions analogously to a garnishment, and the court has the power 
to deal with efforts to evade the lien:
To the extent necessary to effectuate the collection of distributions pursuant to 
a charging order, the court may:
(1) appoint a receiver of the distributions subject to the charging order, with the 
power to make all inquiries the judgment debtor might have made; and
(2) make all other orders necessary to give effect to the charging order.108
The court’s power is limited to evasive conduct and does not extend to inter-
fering in the legitimate activities of the LLC. A court enforcing a charging order 
has no more right to affect the LLC’s obligations to the judgment debtor than the 
court would have to compel a wage garnishee to increase the wages of the debtor 
employee. Thus, a receiver appointed under Re-ULLCA, § 503(b) is emphatically 
103. See, e.g., Re-ULLCA § 110(f) (“To the extent the operating agreement of a member-managed lim-
ited liability company expressly relieves a member of a responsibility that the member would otherwise 
have under this [act] and imposes the responsibility on one or more other members, the operating 
agreement may, to the benefi t of the member that the operating agreement relieves of the responsibility, 
also eliminate or limit any fi duciary duty that would have pertained to the responsibility.”).
104. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Carter G. Bishop, Thomas Earl Geu, Charging Orders and the New 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act—Dispelling Rumors Of Disaster, 18 PROBATE AND PROPERTY 30, 30 (July/
August 2004).
105. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][a][iv].
106. Re-ULLCA, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions of the New Act.
107. Re-ULLCA § 503(a).
108. Id. § 503(b).
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not a receiver for the LLC; the receiver’s powers are limited solely to seeking infor-
mation to which the judgment debtor is entitled.109
As for the court’s power “to make all other orders,” that power is limited to 
those orders “necessary to give effect to the charging order.” The Comment to Sec-
tion 503(b)(2) provides two very important examples:
Example: A judgment creditor with a charging order believes that the limited liabil-
ity company should invest less of its surplus in operations, leaving more funds for 
distributions. The creditor moves the court for an order directing the limited liability 
company to restrict re-investment. Subsection (b)(2) does not authorize the court to 
grant the motion.
Example: A judgment creditor with a judgment for $10,000 against a member ob-
tains a charging order against the member’s transferable interest. Having been prop-
erly served with the order, the limited liability company nonetheless fails to comply 
and makes a $3000 distribution to the member. The court has the power to order the 
limited liability company to pay $3000 to the judgment creditor to “give effect to the 
charging order.”110
K. A REMEDY FOR OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
In 2003, when the Drafting Committee fi rst reported to a NCCUSL annual meet-
ing, the question of a statute-based remedy for oppressive conduct was one of nine 
major topics discussed in the Committee’s briefi ng memo.111 The memo acknowl-
edged that, as of that moment, “[t]he Drafting Committee has had almost no dis-
cussion of this topic, other than to acknowledge that the topic is of great importance 
and will require careful and repeated discussion.”112 The memo then described the 
question before the Committee (and eventually the Conference) as follows:
LLCs may be destined eventually to supplant the corporation as the entity of choice 
for closely held businesses. If so, omitting an oppression remedy from the new Act 
(i) could be interpreted as rejecting the past fi ve decades of legal developments re-
garding oppression, and (ii) would, at minimum, force courts to consider re-inventing 
the corporate oppression wheel in the LLC context.
On the other hand, the limited liability company is essentially a contract-based 
arrangement—at least inter se the members (which is relevant focal point for discus-
sions of oppression). The contracting parties may protect themselves to the extent 
they consider necessary. Moreover, the paucity of LLC statutes with oppression rem-
edies might mean something about proper public policy and certainly has implica-
tions for the prospects of uniform enactment.
109. If the judgment debtor is a mere transferee, the entitlement is nil until dissolution. See id. 
§ 502(a)(3)(B) and (c) (stating that a mere transferee is not entitled to “have access to records or other 
information concerning the company’s activities . . . [except that] [i]n a dissolution and winding up of 
a limited liability company, a transferee is entitled to an account of the company’s transactions only 
from the date of dissolution”).
110. Id. § 503(b)(2) cmt.
111. 2003 NCCUSL Annual Meeting Briefi ng Memo, at 64–72, available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ullca/ann-meet-draft03.pdf.
112. Id. at 70.
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Yet close corporation law developed its protections for minority shareholders by 
analogizing to general partnerships, which are at least as much creatures of contract 
as are limited liability companies (and arguably more so; no public fi ling is necessary 
to create a general partnership). Moreover, in most limited liability companies the 
contractual arrangement is a “relational contract”—i.e., of long duration, with parts 
of the bargain necessarily left open or subject to discretion, and with the parties to 
the bargain signifi cantly interdependent. Although the concept of relational contracts 
has had little impact on the courts, the circumstances described by the concept have 
occasioned legislative intervention at both federal and state levels. Statutes designed 
to protect dealers provide the most notable examples. Whether such intervention 
is good policy is a separate question, but the examples show that on occasion this 
society chooses to have the government intervene “for the sake of fairness” in arrange-
ments that are primarily contractual.113
By 2006, when the Conference gave fi nal approval to the new Act, the inclusion 
of a statute-based remedy was a non-issue; the decision to include a remedy went 
without discussion, let alone debate.114
The new Act’s oppression remedy appears in the section concerning dissolu-
tion. Section 701(a)(5) authorizes a court to dissolve a limited liability company:
on application by a member, . . . on the grounds that the managers or those members 
in control of the company:
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be 
directly harmful to the applicant.115
Section 701(b) authorizes a court to “order a remedy other than dissolution.”116 
The operating agreement cannot alter Section 701(a)(5) but may limit or even 
eliminate subsection (b).117
Providing a remedy for oppression makes good sense. “Like most close corpo-
rations, most limited liability companies face the ‘lock in’ problem and the corre-
sponding susceptibility of minority owners to oppression by those in control.”118 
Moreover, “courts have begun to apply close corporation ‘oppression’ doctrine to 
LLCs.”119
113. Id. at 71–72 (citations omitted).
114. Transcript of 2006 Annual Meeting, supra note 43, at 62–64.
115. Re-ULLCA § 701(a)(5).
116. Id. § 701(b).
117. Id. § 110(c)(7) (stating that an operating agreement may not “vary the power of a court to 
decree dissolution in the circumstances specifi ed in Section 701(a). . . (5)). Section 110(c) does not 
mention section 701(b). Therefore, the operating agreement has plenary power over that provision. 
Id. § 110(a) (stating that (“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), the operating 
agreement governs: (1) relations among the members as members and between the members and 
the limited liability company; . . . [and] (3) the activities of the company and the conduct of those 
activities”).
118. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 120 (2006) [hereinafter “Direct v. Derivative”]. See generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, 
supra note 19, ¶ 10.09.
119. Re-ULLCA, 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701, Reporters’ Notes, available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2005annmtgdraft.htm. See also Harvey Gelb, Fiduciary Duties and Dissolution in 
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The Act’s approach to this question is nuanced, although the nuances are latent 
and refl ect a mixture of reliance on judicial good sense and deference to the mem-
bers’ foresight (i.e., their operating agreement). The Drafting Committee selected 
as the applicable term of art the word “oppressive” rather than the perhaps looser 
phrase “unfairly prejudicial” but then chose not to specify in detail the factors to 
be considered in determining whether conduct is “oppressive.”120 These choices 
refl ect respect for judicial good sense. Deference for the operating agreement 
includes the members’ power under Section 110 to clearly delineate members’ 
discretionary authority. As is stated in the Comment to the section codifying the 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing:
Courts should not use the obligation to change ex post facto the parties’ or this Act’s 
allocation of risk and power. To the contrary, . . . the obligation should be used only 
to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that is manifestly beyond what a 
reasonable person could have contemplated when the arrangements were made. . . . 
In sum, the purpose of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to protect the 
arrangement the [members] have chosen for themselves, not to restructure that ar-
rangement under the guise of safeguarding it.121
It is noteworthy that the oppression remedy is phrased initially as court-
ordered dissolution and that the operating agreement can limit the court to that 
remedy. Dissolution is the “nuclear option” in any dispute among members of a 
closely held business, and a separate provision of the Act authorizes a court to 
fashion a less draconian remedy.122
the Closely Held Business, 3 WYO. L. REV. 547 (2003); Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balanc ing 
Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the 
LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2004); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Com-
pany: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005); Pinnacle Data 
Serv., Inc. v. Gillen, 104 S.W.3d 188, 196 (Tex. App. 2003) (expressly applying close corporation doc-
trine); Wyoming.com, LLC v. Lieberman, 109 P.3d 883, 886 (Wyo. 2005) (Kite, J., concurring) (“We have 
not had the occasion to address Mr. Lieberman’s rights as a minority owner in the LLC nor the obligations 
of the LLC to him as a minority interest owner. Those rights and responsibilities in the context of other 
forms of business organizations are well developed and may provide guidance in the realm of the LLC.”).
120. See 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701(a)(5), Reporters’ Notes, which explain:
At its April, 2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee deleted language that would have cabined 
somewhat the vague term “oppressive.” The deleted language provided that:
oppressive conduct has occurred only if the conduct complained of has directly harmed the ap-
plicant and:
(1) constitutes a material, uncured breach of the operating agreement or of the obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing stated in Section 409(d); or
(2) although not constituting a material, uncured breach under paragraph (1), has substantially 
defeated an expectation of the applicant which is entitled to protection because the expectation:
(A) is not contradicted by any term of the operating agreement nor by the reasonable implication 
of any term of that agreement;
(B) was central to the applicant’s decision to become a member of the limited liability company 
or for a substantial time has been centrally important in the member’s continuing membership;
(C) was known to other members, which expressly or impliedly acquiesced in it;
(D) is consistent with the reasonable expectations of all the members; and
(E) is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
121. Re-ULLCA § 409(d) cmt. (quoting the Comment to ULPA (2001), § 305(b); brackets and fi rst 
ellipsis added).
122. Re-ULLCA § 701(b).
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The Act includes the lesser remedy because: “In the close corporation context, 
many courts have reached this position without express statutory authority, most 
often with regard to court-ordered buyouts of oppressed shareholders. The Draft-
ing Committee preferred to save courts and litigants the trouble of re-inventing 
that wheel in the LLC context.”123 However, the members through their operating 
agreement may override subsection (b), in effect limiting the court (and them-
selves) to the all-or-nothing remedy of dissolution.124
It is also noteworthy that the new Act does not directly address the question 
of member-to-member fi duciary duties. The modern law of close corporations 
makes clear that shareholders owe each other fi duciary duties,125 and some recent 
LLC cases have ruled likewise as to members.126
The new Act takes a different approach. The Act’s partial codifi cation of fi du-
ciary duty of loyalty pertains only to duties that protect the entity,127 and the obli-
gation of good faith and fair dealing is purposefully referred to as “contractual” in 
order to “emphasize that the obligation is not an invitation to re-write agreements 
among the members.”128
There is space, however, for courts to fi nd a fi duciary duty among members. The 
codifi cation in Section 409 is not exhaustive,129 and, indeed, Section 701(a)(5)(B) 
123. Re-ULLCA, 2005 Annual Meeting Draft, § 701(b), Reporters’ Notes.
124. Compare ULPA (2001), § 1206(c)(5) (providing that, for limited partnerships “dragged into” 
the new limited partnership act, “Section 603(5) [authorizing a court to expel a general partner with-
out dissolving the limited partnership] does not apply and a court has the same power to expel a gen-
eral partner as the court had immediately before [the effective date of this [Act]]”) (fi rst set of brackets 
added). The pre-ULPA (2001) case law was divided as to whether—absent an authorizing provision 
in the partnership agreement—a court had the power to expel a general partner without dissolv-
ing the limited partnership. See e.g., Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, 807 F. Supp. 1025,1059–60 
(S.D.N.Y 1992) (“[t]his Court has the power to remove . . . general partners of the Limited Partnerships 
in issue and elevate a limited partner to the position of managing partner in order to preserve the 
partnership . . . . ” ); Heikel v. 268 Ltd., No. 87-2464, 1989 WL 123632, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 1989), 
(“to be legitimate, the expulsion must be ‘bona fi de under the partnership agreement’” and regardless 
of legitimate expulsion, the “ouster” from the partnership dissolved the limited partnership).
125. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) is 
perhaps the seminal case, but other examples abound. See generally 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL AND ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATION & LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:27 (Rev. 3d ed. 
2006); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith—The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held Corporations, 
16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143 (1990); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability 
Company: Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005).
126. Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (“Indiana 
LLCs, being similar to Indiana partnerships and corporations impose a common law fi duciary duty 
on their offi cers and members in the absence of contrary provisions in LLC operating agreements.”); 
Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 
21, 2003) (“[s]ince it is also well established as a fundamental rule of partnerships, that all partners, 
not just the majority, owe each other fi duciary duties (Lightfoot v. Hardaway, 751 S.W.2d 844, 849 
(Tenn.Ct.App.1988)), it logically follows that a majority of the members of an “LLC” should owe a 
fi duciary duty to the minority members just like the duty a majority of the shareholders of an “Inc.” 
owe the minority shareholders.”) (citations and emphasis in original).
127. Re-ULLCA § 409(b)(1)-(3) (“to account to the company . . . [for usurped company oppor-
tunities]; to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of the company’s 
activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the company; and . . . to refrain from 
competing with the company . . . . ”).
128. Id. § 409(d) and cmt.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 45–49.
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inescapably implies that “those members in control of the company” have a duty 
to avoid acting “in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly 
harmful” to another member.130
However, while articulating member-to-member fi duciary duty would put the 
Act squarely within the modern law of closely held business,131 the question is 
largely semantic. The oppression remedy exists, and conduct by “those members 
in control of the company” will trigger it.132
L. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
The distinction between direct and derivative claims follows from the status of 
a business organization as a legal person distinct from its owners.133 Following the 
majority view in the case law of closely held businesses,134 the new Act requires 
a member who brings a direct action to “plead and prove an actual or threatened 
injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to be suffered 
by the limited liability company.”135
The Act recognizes the direct/derivative distinction as an important safeguard 
to the members’ agreed-upon arrangements.136 The Act’s provisions on derivative 
claims are modern, based on the provisions of ULPA (2001), which improved on 
the provisions of ULLCA, which in turn had improved on the provisions of the 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976/1985).
The Act innovates by expressly providing for special litigation committees. As 
explained by the Comment to Section 905:
Although special litigation committees are best known in the corporate fi eld, they are 
no more inherently corporate than derivative litigation or the notion that an organiza-
tion is a person distinct from its owners. An “SLC” can serve as an ADR mechanism, 
130. Re-ULLCA § 701(a)(5)(B).
131. See supra note 119.
132. Fiduciary duty is, in its origins, an equitable concept. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Re-
source Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1493 (2002) (citing L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Re-
lationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69–72). It has been stated that “[t]he maxim of the common law 
that wherever there is a right there is a remedy for its infraction has never been adopted by courts of 
equity.” Powers v. Bald Eagle Boom Co., 17 A. 254, 255 (Pa. 1889). But here the situation is opposite. 
The Act creates the remedy and a right to pursue it. Articulating a duty correlative with the right may 
be of conceptual interest, but as a practical matter the Act’s protection is suffi cient as is.
133. See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 10.01 [2][b][i] for a general treatment of this 
topic and Direct v. Derivative, supra note 118, for a detailed analysis.
134. Direct v. Derivative, supra note 118, at 118–19.
135. Re-ULLCA § 901(b). See also id. §§ 409(a) (formulating the duties of loyalty and care as 
“owe[d] to the company and, subject to Section 901(b), the other members”), 701(a)(5)(B) (permitting 
a member to seek dissolution on account of conduct that “was, is, or will be directly harmful to the ap-
plicant”) (emphasis added).
136. See e.g., Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 14 n.16 (S.D. 1997) (“Those who operate and 
manage these [small, corporate] farms and businesses, often the majority shareholders, should not 
be subject to the demands of minority shareholders whose concern may be solely that of dividends 
and not the farm or business itself. Many of these small corporations and their management are ill-
prepared to invest the time and money required to fend off a minority shareholder suit and are there-
fore infl uenced by the mere threat of such litigation.”).
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help protect an agreed upon arrangement from strike suits, protect the interests of 
members who are neither plaintiffs nor defendants (if any), and bring to any judicial 
decision the benefi ts of a specially tailored business judgment.137
The Act adopts the Auerbach approach to judicial review of SLC decisions.138 
The SLC has the burden of proving “that the members of the committee were 
disinterested and independent and that the committee acted in good faith, inde-
pendently, and with reasonable care,”139 but—if the SLC meets this burden—the 
court may not substitute its judgment for the SLC’s.140
To allow an SLC to do its work, and to blunt one of the weapons of a strike 
suit, “on motion by the committee made in the name of the company . . . the court 
shall stay discovery for the time reasonably necessary to permit the committee 
to make its investigation.”141 However, the court may refuse or limit the stay “for 
good cause shown” by the plaintiffs, and the SLC provision “does not prevent the 
court from enforcing a person’s right to information under Section 410 [provid-
ing extensive information rights to members] or, for good cause shown, granting 
extraordinary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction.”142
M.  ORGANIC TRANSACTIONS—MERGERS, CONVERSIONS, 
AND DOMESTICATIONS
Modern LLC statutes provide for a panoply of entity-transformative transac-
tions, ranging from intra-species/intra-jurisdiction (i.e., a merger of domestic LLCs) 
to cross-species/cross-jurisdiction (e.g. a domestic LLC converting into anoth-
er type of organization under the law of a different jurisdiction).143 Article 10 of 
the new Act provides for an LLC’s participation in the three generally recognized 
“organic” transactions: mergers, conversions, and domestications.144
For Article 10 to apply, a domestic limited liability company must be involved 
either as “input” or “output.” For example, Article 10 applies to a merger in which 
a domestic LLC and two foreign LLCs merge into a foreign limited partnership 
and also to a conversion in which a foreign limited partnership becomes a do-
mestic LLC. The Act does not include interest exchanges (the unincorporated 
analog to the corporate “share exchange”), because that type of transaction would 
137. Re-ULLCA § 905 cmt.
138. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619 (N.Y. 1979).
139. Re-ULLCA § 905(e).
140. See id. § 905(d) cmt. (“The standard stated for judicial review of the SLC determination fol-
lows Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. 1979) rather than Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), because the latter’s reference to a court’s business judgment has 
generally not been followed in other states.”) (citations in original).
141. Re-ULLCA § 905(a).
142. Id.
143. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶¶ 12.09, 12.11.
144. Re-ULLCA Article 10. The Re-ULLCA provisions are based closely on comparable provisions 
in ULPA (2001), except that Re-ULLCA treats domestications and conversations as separate types of 
transactions. ULPA (2001) treats domestications as a subset of conversions. Re-ULLCA § 1001 cmt.
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be novel in the unincorporated context and is far from universally accepted in 
corporate law.145
The following matrix shows the range of possibilities under Article 10:
intra-jurisdiction inter-jurisdiction
intra-species • merger involving 
only domestic LLCs
• merger involving both 
domestic and foreign LLCs 
but no other “species” of 
entity
• domestication
inter-species • merger involving a 
domestic LLC and at 
least one other do-
mestic “species”
• conversion in which 
a domestic LLC 
becomes another 
species of domestic 
entity, or vice versa
• merger involving a domestic 
LLC and at least one other 
foreign “species” (and per-
haps other domestic organi-
zations as well)
• conversion in which a do-
mestic LLC becomes another 
species of foreign entity, or 
vice versa
N. THE DECISION TO ESCHEW THE SERIES LLC
A series LLC “authorizes an extraordinary type of membership interest—one that 
neither pertains to nor partakes of an entire LLC but rather is associated with and 
segregated to a compartmentalized set of assets, profi ts, losses, and liabilities.”146 
An LLC statute that authorizes series LLCs permits “an LLC to compartmentalize 
its operations and create ‘internal’ shields to protect assets associated with one 
aspect of the business from claims pertaining to others. Under [a series provision], 
an LLC may associate specifi ed assets and operations with a particular series of 
membership interests and limit claims and obligations pertaining to those inter-
ests and operations to the specifi ed assets.”147
States ranging from Delaware to Iowa have authorized series LLCs,148 and the 
Drafting Committee considered following those states. Indeed, at its February, 
145. For example, the Delaware corporate statute does not provide for share exchanges (DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251–66 (2007)), and neither does California (CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1100–1113 (West 
Supp. 2006)). But see N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 913(a)(1) (McKinney 2003) (“[t]wo domestic corpora-
tions may, as provided in this section, participate in the consummation of a plan for binding share 
exchanges”); id. §913(f)(1) (“[a] foreign corporation and a domestic corporation may participate in 
a share exchange, but, if the subject corporation is a foreign corporation, only if such exchange is 
permitted by the laws of the jurisdiction under which such foreign corporation is incorporated.”).
146. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 14.06[1][c].
147. Id. ¶ 6.01[5].
148. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2007) and IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.305 (West 1999). For an 
example of an ULLCA-based statute that permits series, see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/37-40 (West 
Supp. 2006).
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2006 meeting, the Committee considered a series provision that would have sig-
nifi cantly advanced the concept.149
Ultimately, however, the Drafting Committee declined to accept the series con-
cept. A March 2006 “Progress Report” on the new Act contained the following 
explanation for this decision:
Originally devised by sophisticated Delaware lawyers for their “funds” clients, series 
are now being (mis)used to subdivide assets of operating businesses and to provide 
unwarranted hopes of low cost “asset protection.” No one quite knows what will hap-
pen under bankruptcy law when a series becomes insolvent. Nor does anyone know 
whether the courts of a non-series state will respect the “internal shields” of a series 
LLC. Most LLC statutes provide that “foreign law governs” the liability of members 
of a foreign LLC. However, those provisions are irrelevant [to a foreign series LLC] 
because they pertain to the liability of a member for the obligations of the LLC. For a 
series LLC, the pivotal question is entirely different—namely, whether some assets of 
an LLC should be immune from some of the creditors of the LLC.
What’s good for Delaware and highly sophisticated deals is not necessarily good 
for the LLC law of other states. A philosophy that works wonders for “high end” 
transactions may be bad medicine for the thousands of more prosaic but nonetheless 
important closely held businesses that choose to house themselves within LLCs.150
A recent posting to LNET-LLC (a list serve focusing on limited liability compa-
nies) contained a more picturesque (but equally emphatic) description of the foibles 
of the series concept. Sent by a practitioner who had been one of the ABA Business 
Law Section Advisors to the Re-ULLCA Drafting Committee, the posting stated:
Series, as I understand them, originated in the mutual fund and structured fi nance 
realms. Asset/liability partitioning is there not a signifi cant issue as the possibility 
of tort liability is low and insurance is available. That statement would not true is a 
series of a fund defaulted on lets say a signifi cant derivative contract, but I have not 
seen that case.
But let’s step away from that realm. What is the reason that series are being con-
sidered /adopted outside of Delaware? What need is fi lled in the practical world (you 
know, the one in which Larry Curly and Moe open a factory at 1 Blackacre Lane to 
make widgets) by the series? In light of the at best signifi cant (overwhelming?) issues 
of indefi nite federal and state taxation, securities compliance (please raise your hand 
if you are willing to issue a clean non-consolidation opinion between offerings of 
series), drafting complexity, the issue of whether the internal liability shield will be 
respected in states that do not have series provisions, and the ultimate possibility that 
the bankruptcy is going to consolidate all of the series into the parent, why would you 
use a series LLC/LP in the practical world?
149. The draft provided, inter alia, that: “The articles of organization may provide that a designated 
series shall be treated as a separate entity distinct from the limited liability company, other series of the 
limited liability company, and members. . . . A designated series has the capacity to sue and be sued in 
its own name and the power to do all things necessary or convenient to carry on its activities.” ULLCA 
II Series Draft, § 210(i) and (k), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006FebSerDraft.
htm (last visited 11/26/2006).
150. Progress Report, supra note 12, at 9 (citations omitted).
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For me it is not enough (sorry, it is not even on the radar screen) that I can avoid 
needing to form multiple SMLLCs [single member limited liability companies] to 
segregate liabilities and assets. That cost is de minimus and I am pretty sure I know 
the requirements and effect of doing so.
Sorry, I just have not seen a compelling case for series outside of the mutual fund 
and structured fi nance area.151
A subsequently posted suggestion that administrative costs might be lower with 
a series LLC than with a set of single-member LLCs drew the following response 
from the practitioner who had served as the principal ABA Advisor to the Re-
ULLCA Drafting Committee:
While I have mixed feelings about series, . . . . I would be surprised if the savings in fi ling 
fees in any but the most regressively taxed of states would approach the marginal costs 
in terms of legal and record-keeping of series. I understand that people have found sig-
nifi cant benefi ts of series in some specialized circumstances such as securitization and 
international contexts, and those benefi ts in some highly lawyered deals may be worth-
while, but the cost of setting up or maintaining series would not seem an appropriate 
consideration. If the client is spending less on keeping track of the series interests that he/
she/it would on maintaining separate SMLLCS, the client is probably doing it wrong.152
Certainly the debate over series LLCs will continue.
O. THE LOT OF “MERE” TRANSFEREES
Under the new Act, absent a contrary agreement:
• a person who ceases to be a member of an LLC, for any reason, has no “pay 
out” right and becomes solely a transferee of the person’s own transferable 
interest;153
• the transferee of a transferable interest does not become a member, has no 
governance rights and virtually no information rights, regardless of whether 
the transfer was voluntary, involuntary, gratuitous, or for consideration;154
• members may alter the operating agreement and affect a transferee’s rights, 
without the consent of the transferee;155
• the LLC’s duration is perpetual156 and a transferee has no right to seek dis-
solution,157 which means that the transferee is “locked in” to its status in 
perpetuity, or until the members decide otherwise.
151. Posted by Thomas E. Rutledge, Sat. Oct 21, 2006 5:39 am (PDT) (copy on fi le with The Busi-
ness Lawyer). This posting occurred after and outside of the Re-ULLCA drafting process.
152. Robert E. Keatinge (sent to lnet-llc@yahoogroups.com; Monday, October 23, 2006 at 3:22 p.m., 
on fi le with The Business Lawyer). Lin Hanson, who helped devise the series provisions of the Illinois 
statute, subsequently stated: “That would surely be true in Illinois.” (sent to lnet-llc@yahoogroups.com; 
Friday, October 27, 2006 1:52 p.m., on fi le with The Business Lawyer). These postings also occurred 
after and outside of the Re-ULLCA drafting process.
153. Re-ULLCA § 603(a)(3).
154. Id. §§ 502 and 410(f).
155. Id. § 112(b).
156. Id. § 104(c).
157. Id. § 701.
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Extreme as this situation may appear, it is consistent with partnership law 
precedent158 and the “pick your partner” principle that is at the core of LLC 
law.159 The Drafting Committee struggled with the issue of transferee vulner-
ability, and under several “meeting” drafts transferees had standing to seek dis-
solution in circumstances of egregious misconduct.160 However, the Committee 
was unable to determine how to avoid transferee vulnerability without giving 
transferees the power to “freeze the deal” and interfere in governance via threat 
of litigation.161
In its fi nal regularly scheduled meeting, the Drafting Committee excised the 
provision giving transferees standing.162 A Comment acknowledges that the Act 
itself will not be the fi nal word on this issue:
The law of unincorporated business organizations is only beginning to grapple in a 
modern way with the tension between the rights of an organization’s owners to carry 
on their activities as they see fi t (or have agreed) and the rights of transferees of the 
organization’s economic interests. (Such transferees can include the heirs of business 
founders as well as former owners who are “locked in” as transferees of their own 
interests). . . . This Act does not address the question of whether, in extreme circum-
stances, transferees might be able to claim some type of duty or obligation to protect 
against expropriation.163
158. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. (discussing Bauer v. Blomfi eld Co./Holden Joint Venture, 849 P2d 
1365 (Alaska 1993). See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][e]. However, until ULPA 
(2001), § 104(c) provided a perpetual term for limited partnerships, partnership law did not have to 
take into account the problem of perpetual lock-in. See UPA § 32(2) (permitting an assignee to seek 
judicial dissolution of an at-will general partnership at any time and of a partnership for a term or un-
dertaking if partnership continues in existence after the completion of the term or undertaking); RUPA 
§ 801(6) (same except adding the requirement that the court determine that dissolution is equitable); 
ULLCA § 801(5) (same as RUPA). Moreover, the partnership cases are few in number and may not 
hold in the context of a business entity that has become the vehicle of choice not only for sophisticated 
entrepreneurs but also for mom, pop, and the neighbors down the street.
159. Re-ULLCA § 502 cmt. See BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][a][iv] and Klein-
berger, Prism, supra note 73, at 842, 863.
160. For example, the February 2006 Meeting Draft § 701(a)(5) provided for court ordered dis-
solution “on application by a member, a dissociated member that has retained a transferable interest, or 
a transferee, . . .on the grounds that the managers or those members in control of the limited liability 
company: (A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or (B) have 
acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the ap-
plicant.” (emphasis added). The February 2006 Meeting Draft is available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006febmtg.htm.
161. See Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. (“If the law categorically favors the owners, there is a serious 
risk of expropriation and other abuse. On the other hand, if the law grants former owners and other 
transferees the right to seek judicial protection, that specter can “freeze the deal” as of the moment an 
owner leaves the enterprise or a third party obtains an economic interest.”).
162. Compare the February 2006 Meeting Draft, § 701(a)(5) with the 2006 Annual Meeting Draft, 
§ 701(a)(5).
163. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt. The reference to “heirs of business founders” recalls the seminal 
close corporation case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 
(Mass. 1975). If the entity in Donahue had been an LLC formed under the new Act, it would have 
been necessary for the court to go outside to Act to fi nd a cause of action for the widow of one of the 
company’s two founders.
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IV. A ROADMAP THROUGH INTRICACY—THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
A.  THE BROAD SCOPE AND UNFETTERED SOURCES OF THE 
OPERATING AGREEMENT
Jurisdictions from coast to coast and from border to border agree that the oper-
ating agreement is foundational to any LLC.164 “A limited liability company is as 
much a creature of contract as of statute,”165 and, accordingly, the new Act devotes 
a defi nition and three major operational sections to the operating agreement.166
The Act defi nes the operating agreement in very broad terms:
“Operating agreement” means the agreement, whether or not referred to as an op-
erating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination 
thereof, of all the members of a limited liability company, including a sole member, 
concerning the matters described in Section 110(a). The term includes the agreement 
as amended or restated.167
This defi nition contains no “statute of frauds.”168 To the contrary, the phrase 
“whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof” means that—
at least so far as the Act is concerned—the contents of the operating agreement 
164. Denevi v. Green Valley Corp., No. CV784721, 2005 WL 236386, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
21, 2005) (“[i]n general, relations among members and between the members and a limited liability 
company are governed by articles of organization and an operating agreement”); Elf Atochem N. Am., 
Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (“‘[i]t is the policy of [the Act] to give the maximum 
effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 
agreements.’”) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)); Kinke v. R.D.C., LLC, 889 So.2d 405, 
409 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“An operating agreement, whether written or oral, governs the operation of 
the LLC . . . [a]n operating agreement is contractual in nature; thus, it binds the members of the LLC as 
written and is interpreted pursuant to contract law”); Lentricular Eur., LLC v. Cunnally, 693 N.W.2d 
302, 307 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (“[t]he numerous opportunities for members of an LLC to choose to be 
governed by terms that differ from those in the statute plainly express the legislature’s intent to provide 
LLC members with the fl exibility to defi ne many aspects of their relationship by contract,” but holding 
when operating agreement is ambiguous as to whether it intended to override statutory provisions, the 
statutory provisions govern). See generally BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 5.06 [1] [b].
165. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
166. Id. §§ 110–12. In addition, “An operating agreement is a contract, and therefore all statutory 
language pertaining to the operating agreement must be understood in the context of the law of con-
tracts.” Id. § 102(13) cmt.
167. Id. § 102(13).
168. As to whether other statutes of fraud might apply, see Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt. (“This Act 
states no rule as to whether the statute of frauds applies to an oral operating agreement. Case law 
suggests that an oral agreement to form a partnership or joint venture with a term exceeding one 
year is within the statute. See, e.g.¸ Abbott v. Hurst, 643 So.2d 589, 592 (Ala. 1994) (“Partnership 
agreements, like other contracts, are subject to the Statute of Frauds. A contract of partnership for a 
term exceeding one year is within the Statute of Frauds and is void unless it is in writing; however, a 
contract establishing a partnership terminable at the will of any partner is generally held to be capable 
of performance by its terms within one year of its making and, therefore, to be outside the Statute of 
Frauds.”) (citations omitted); Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Const. Co., 244 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1951) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s contention that mere part performance suffi ced to take the oral agreement outside 
the statute and holding that partnership was therefore at will); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int’l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 
812, 827–28 (2d Cir.1984) (same analysis with regard to a joint venture). However, it is not possible 
to form an LLC without signing and delivering to the fi ling offi cer a certifi cate of organization in record 
form, Re-ULLCA § 201(a), and the Act itself then establishes the LLC’s duration. Subject to the operat-
ing agreement, that duration is perpetual. Id. § 104(c). An oral provision of an operating agreement 
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can be established by words, written or spoken, conduct, or some combination of 
these. The one mechanical requirement is assent: “Absent a contrary provision in 
the operating agreement, a threshold qualifi cation for status as part of the ‘operat-
ing agreement’ is the assent of all the persons then members.”169
The Act does not specifi cally empower the operating agreement to impose a 
private statute of frauds—i.e., to provide that amendments must be in writing.170 
However, Section 110(a)(4) empowers the operating agreement to determine “the 
means and conditions for amending the operating agreement.” According to the 
Comment to that provision, “Paragraph (a)(4) could be read to encompass such 
authorization.”171 Moreover, “under Section 107 [supplemental principles of law] 
the parol evidence rule will apply to a written operating agreement containing an 
appropriate merger provision.”172
B. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF SECTION 110
Section 110 is the most intricate of the sections dealing with the operating 
agreement, and most of its intricacy concerns the “complex question[] . . . [of] the 
calling for performance that extends beyond a year might be within the one-year provision—e.g., an 
oral agreement that a particular member will serve (and be permitted to serve) as manager for three 
years. An oral provision of an operating agreement which involves the transfer of land, whether by 
or to the LLC, might come within the land provision of the statute of frauds. Froiseth v. Nowlin, 287 
P. 55, 56 (Wash. 1930) (“[The land provision] applies to an oral contract to transfer or convey partner-
ship real property, and the interest of the other partners therein, to one partner as an individual, as 
well as to a parol contract by one of the parties to convey certain land owned by him individually to 
the partnership, or to another partner, or to put it into the partnership stock.”) (quoting 27 CORPUS 
JURIS 220).”). In contrast, the fact that a limited liability company owns or deals in real property does 
not bring within the land provision agreements pertaining to the LLC’s membership interests. Interests 
in a limited liability company are personal property and refl ect no direct interest in the entity’s assets. 
Re-ULLCA §§ 501 & 102(21). Thus, the real property issues pertaining to the LLC’s ownership of land 
do not “fl ow through” to the members and membership interests. See, e.g., Wooten v. Marshall, 153 
F. Supp. 759, 763–64 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (involving an “oral agreement for a joint venture concerning 
the purchase, exploitation and eventual disposition of this 160 acre tract” and stating “[t]he real prop-
erty acquired and dealt with by the venturers takes on the character of personal property as between 
the partners in the enterprise, and hence is not covered by [the Statute of Frauds].”). For other land-
related consequences of the LLC’s status as a separate entity, see BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, 
¶ 5.05 [1][e] (“An LLC’s separate legal status also affects property rights. A member’s contribution of 
property to an LLC constitutes ‘more than a change in the form of ownership; it is a transfer from one 
entity to another.’ This change means that contributed property is out of the reach of the contributor’s 
creditors, unless that creditor can make a case of fraudulent transfer or persuade the court to do a 
reverse pierce, treating the LLC as if it were the member. Where real property is involved, the change 
in ownership implicates real estate transfer taxes and means that the former owner of property con-
tributed to an LLC lacks standing to contest zoning activities pertaining to the property. Similarly, 
members deadlocked over the use of an LLC’s real property have no right to a partition of that property 
and evidence of unjust enrichment as to the property of an LLC is not, by itself, evidence of unjust 
enrichment as to the sole owner of the LLC.”).
169. Re-ULLCA § 102(13) cmt. See id. § 407(b)(5) (“The operating agreement may be amended 
only with the consent of all members.”) (member-managed LLC) and id. § 407(c)(4)(D) (“The consent 
of all members is required to . . . amend the operating agreement.”) (manager-managed LLC).
170. Compare U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (permitting a written contract for the sale of goods to preclude 
modifi cations except through a writing signed by the parties).
171. Re-ULLCA § 110(a)(4) cmt.
172. Id.
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extent to which an agreement among the organization’s owners can affect the law 
of fi duciary duty.”173 The Comment to Section 110 provides the following “road-
map” to the section:
Subsection (a) grants broad, general authority to the operating agreement
Subsection (b) establishes this Act as comprising the “default rules” (“gap fi llers”) 
for matters within the purview of the operating agreement but not 
addressed by the operating agreement
Subsection (c) states restrictions on the power of the operating agreement, espe-
cially but not exclusively with regard to fi duciary duties and the 
contractual obligation of good faith
Subsection (d) contains specifi c grants of authority for the operating agreement 
with regard to fi duciary duty and the contractual obligation of 
good faith; expressed so as to state restrictions on those specifi c 
grants—including the “if not manifestly unreasonable” standard
Subsection (e) specifi cally grants the operating agreement the power to provide 
mechanisms for approving or ratifying conduct that would oth-
erwise violate the duty of loyalty; expressed so as to state restric-
tions on those mechanism—full disclosure and disinterested and 
independent decision makers
Subsection (f) specifi cally authorizes the operating agreement to divest a member 
of fi duciary duty with regard to a matter if the operating agreement 
is also divesting the person of responsibility for the matter (and 
imposing that responsibility on one or more other members)
Subsection (g) contains specifi c grants of authority for the operating agreement 
with regard to indemnifi cation and exculpatory provisions; ex-
pressed so as to state restrictions on those specifi c grants
Subsection (h) provides rules for applying the “not manifestly unreasonable” 
standard established by subsection (d)
It is important to remember that Section 110(a) states the most important gen-
eral principle regarding the operating agreement. Except as specifi cally and ex-
pressly limited by other provisions of the Act, it is the operating agreement—not 
the Act—which provides for the members the “rules of the game.”174
C. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
The Act’s most important and intricate limitations apply when the operating 
agreement eliminates, limits, or delineate some aspect of fi duciary duty. Section 
110 expressly authorizes such provisions—other than the wholesale elimination 
of all fi duciary duty—and establishes a two-layered approach for dealing with 
challenges.
173. Re-ULLCA § 110 cmt.
174. The operating agreement also governs a small set of non-members. Re-ULLCA § 110(a)(2) 
(stating that the operating agreement governs “the rights and duties under this [act] of a person in 
the capacity of manager”), id. § 112(b) (providing that the operating agreement controls the rights of 
transferees and dissociated members).
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The fi rst layer involves the reach of the challenged provision. The following 
chart appears in the Comment to Section 110(d)(3):
duty extent of operating agree-
ment’s power to restrict 
the duty(subject to the 
“manifestly unreasonable” 
standard)Section 
110(d)(1), (3) and (4)
power of the operating 
agreement to provide 
indemnity or exculpation 
w/r/t breach of the 
dutySection 110(g)
loyalty restrict or completely 
eliminate
none
care alter, but not eliminate; 
specifi cally may not author-
ize intentional misconduct or 
knowing violation of law
complete
other fi duciary 
duties, not 
codifi ed in the 
statute
restrict or completely 
eliminate
complete
The second layer involves the “not manifestly unreasonable” standard, which Sec-
tion 110(d) imposes and Section 110(h) explicates. Subsection (h) is protective of 
the operating agreement and provides: “The court shall decide any claim under 
subsection (d) that a term of an operating agreement is manifestly unreasonable.”
The “manifestly unreasonable” standard has been part of the law of unincorporated 
business organizations since the adoption of RUPA,175 but subsection (h) is entirely 
new. The Comment to subsection (h) explains the subsection’s rationale and purpose:
The “not manifestly unreasonable standard” became part of uniform business entity 
statutes when RUPA imported the concept from the Uniform Commercial Code. This 
subsection provides rules for applying that standard, which are necessary because:
• Determining unreasonableness inter se owners of an organization is a dif-
ferent task than doing so in a commercial context, where concepts like 
“usages of trade” are available to inform the analysis. Each business orga-
nization must be understood in its own terms and context.
• If loosely applied, the standard would permit a court to rewrite the mem-
bers’ agreement, which would destroy the balance this Act seeks to estab-
lish between freedom of contract and fi duciary duty.
• Case law research indicates that courts have tended to disregard the sig-
nifi cance of the word “manifestly.”
175. RUPA § 103(b)(3)(i), (b)(5).
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• Some decisions have considered reasonableness as of the time of the com-
plaint, which means that a prospectively reasonable allocation of risk 
could be overturned because it functioned as agreed.176
An example illustrates the importance of the “as of when” issue.
EXAMPLE: When a particular manager-managed LLC comes into existence, its busi-
ness plan is quite unusual and its success depends on the willingness of a particular 
individual to serve as the LLC’s sole manager. This individual has a rare combination 
of skills, experiences, and contacts, which are particularly appropriate for the LLC’s 
start-up. In order to induce the individual to accept the position of sole manager, the 
members are willing to have the operating agreement signifi cantly limit the manager’s 
fi duciary duties. Several years later, when the LLC’s operations have turned prosaic 
and the manager’s talents and background are not nearly so crucial, a member chal-
lenges the fi duciary duty limitations as manifestly unreasonable. The relevant time 
under subsection (h)(1) is when the LLC began. Subsequent developments are not 
relevant, except as they might inferentially bear on the circumstances in existence at 
the relevant time.177
D.  THE EXPANSIVE REACH OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT—TO 
TRANSFEREES, DISSOCIATED MEMBERS, INCOMING MEMBERS, 
MANAGERS, AND THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ITSELF
Under the new Act, an operating agreement is both a contract178 and more than 
a contract. The Act defi nes “operating agreement” to include a contract with only 
one party179 and, in Sections 111 and 112, provides that the operating controls the 
rights of specifi ed non-parties.
In some respects, giving the operating agreement’s “extraterritorial” power is 
sensible and even traditional. For example, Section 112(b) provides: “The obliga-
tions of a limited liability company and its members to a person in the person’s 
capacity as a transferee or dissociated member are governed by the operating 
agreement.”180 A transferee is, in effect, the assignee of the transferor’s economic 
rights, and a person dissociated as a member relates to the LLC as if the transferee 
of the person’s own transferable interest.181 It is hornbook contract law that an as-
signee “stands in the shoes” of the assignor and is governed by the contract.182
Likewise it makes sense for Section 111(b) to provide: “A person that becomes 
a member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to the operating 
agreement.”183 Because “[a] limited liability company is as much a creature of 
176. Re-ULLCA § 110(h) cmt. The Comment also notes: “If a person claims that a term of the 
operating agreement in manifestly unreasonable under subsections (d) and (h), as a matter of ordinary 
procedural law the burden is on the person making the claim.” Id.
177. Id. § 110(h)(1) cmt.
178. See the discussion supra at notes 28–34, 165 and accompanying text.
179. See the discussion supra at notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
180. Re-ULLCA § 112(b).
181. Id. § 603(a)(3).
182. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.8 (4th ed. 2004).
183. Re-ULLCA § 111(b).
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contract as of statute,”184 membership in an LLC is inextricably and inevitably 
connected with being party to the operating agreement.
Other aspects of the operating agreement’s reach are not so traditional or self-
evidently sensible. Most remarkably, the Act breaks with the common law of con-
tracts and provides that transferee rights are subject to changes in the operating 
agreement that occur after the transfer. Section 112(b) states:
Subject only to any court order issued under Section 503(b)(2) to effectuate a charg-
ing order, an amendment to the operating agreement made after a person becomes a 
transferee or dissociated member is effective with regard to any debt, obligation, or 
other liability of the limited liability company or its members to the person in the 
person’s capacity as a transferee or dissociated member.185
The Drafting Committee adopted this provision to avoid the “specter” of “for-
mer owners and other transferees” being able to “ ‘freeze the deal’ as of the mo-
ment an owner leaves the enterprise or a third party obtains an economic interest” 
in the LLC.186 Contract law is to the contrary,187 and the danger is that “[i]f the law 
categorically favors the owners, there is a serious risk of expropriation and other 
abuse.”188
The operating agreement also governs “the rights and duties under this [act] 
of a person in the capacity of manager,”189 even though a non-member manager 
might not be party to the operating agreement.190 A non-member manager has at 
least two methods of self-protection: entering into a separate agreement with the 
LLC, the breach of which (through changes in the operating agreement) would 
provide the manager remedies; or insisting that the operating agreement include 
provisions that (i) specify the manager’s rights and duties, and (ii) give the man-
ager veto power over any amendments pertaining to those rights and duties.
Section 112(a) expressly authorizes veto rights for non-members (following 
Delaware law),191 and the Comment to that subsection provides an example in-
volving a manager’s self-protection:
EXAMPLE: A non-member manager enters into a management contract with the 
LLC, and that agreement provides in part that the LLC may remove the manager 
without cause only with the consent of members holding 2/3 of the profi ts interests. 
The operating agreement contains a parallel provision, but the non-member manager 
is not a party to the operating agreement. Later the LLC members amend the operat-
ing agreement to change the quantum to a simple majority and thereafter purport to 
184. Id. § 110 cmt.
185. Id. § 112(b).
186. Id. § 112(b) cmt. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see supra notes 153–63 and 
accompanying text (Section III-O).
187. BISHOP AND KLEINBERGER, supra note 19, ¶ 8.06 [2][e].
188. Re-ULLCA § 112(b) cmt.
189. Id. § 110(a)(2).
190. The Act defi nes the operating agreement as “the agreement, whether or not referred to as an 
operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all the 
members,” Re-ULLCA § 102(13), but does not expressly rule out a non-member being a party. Re-
ULLCA § 407(c)(6) recognizes that “[a] person need not be a member to be a manager.”
191. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-302(e) (2007).
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remove the manager without cause. Although the LLC has undoubtedly breached its 
contract with the manager and subjected itself to a damage claim, the LLC has the 
power under Section 110(a)(2) to effect the removal—unless the operating agree-
ment provided the non-member manager a veto right over changes in the quantum 
provision.192
The new Act also provides a special rule for the relationship of the operating 
agreement to the limited liability company. Section 111(a) states: “A limited li-
ability company is bound by and may enforce the operating agreement, whether 
or not the company has itself manifested assent to the operating agreement.”193 
As a theoretical matter, the Act seems again at odds with the basic constructs of 
contract law.194 As a practical matter, however, the rule is certainly desirable.
V. CONCLUSION
Statute drafting is a craft, in many ways analogous to designing and building by 
hand an intricate and beautiful cabinet. The authors of this article (co-reporters 
for the Drafting Committee) hope that business lawyers and legislators will fi nd 
Re-ULLCA well designed, well crafted, and ready for use.
192. Re-ULLCA § 112(a) cmt.
193. Id. § 111(a).
194. In general, only parties to a contract are fully entitled to enforce it and fully subject to its 
provisions. For example, an assignee’s claims are subject to the contract, but the assignee itself is not 
directly liable for any breach of the contract. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Campbell Design Group, Inc., 914 
S.W.2d 43, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (“What is not discussed by [the company] is the basic legal premise 
that a contract generally binds no one but the parties thereto, and it cannot impose any contractual 
obligation or liability on one not a party to it. The record does not establish that either of the individual 
defendants was a party to the contract. Language in a contract to which they were not parties cannot 
bind them.”) (citations omitted.) See generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Crack in the Shield? Malpractice 
Coverage At Risk, 63 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 26 (September 2006). For a hypothesis of why the new Act 
(and other LLC statutes) avoid deeming the LLC a party to the operating agreement, see Prism, supra 
note 73, at 870–71.
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